Social Sciences - The Institute for Sustainable Development

Back to The Post-Fordist Politics of Sustainability on Long Island LONG ISLAND: FROM CRISIS TO POST-FORDISM

During the post-World War II era, Long Island matured into one of the nation's premier suburban regions. William Levitt pioneered his mass produced housing on Long Island in Island Trees, renamed Levittown in 1948 (Jackson, 1985). This innovation, coupled with federally subsidized home mortgages, allowed housing developments to mushroom across Nassau County, replacing established potato fields. As city residents relocated to the suburbs, Nassau County's population tripled from 400,000 (1940) to 1.4 million (1970). The local employment base was dominated by local service industries for New York City commuters and their families and Long Island's aerospace industries.

Long Island secured its suburban preeminence through a combination of size and wealth. With 2.6 million inhabitants in 1990, it is the largest suburban SMSA in the country. In terms of wealth, Long Island ranked first in the nation in median disposable income ($62,000), household retail sales ($33,000), and the percentage of households with incomes over $50,000 (62.7%) in 1995 (Townsend, 1996). In a recent survey, four of the top ten wealthiest towns in the United States were on Long Island; many other Long Island communities were in the list's top fifty (Rather, 1996).
Property wealth is carefully guarded through Long Island's maze of exclusionary zoning regulations. The politics of post-war suburban exclusion has centered on issues of race and class (Danielson, 1976; Plotkin, 1987). Large-lot zoning, limitations on multi-family dwellings, and building height restrictions are just a few of the building code regulations used by local communities to limit unwanted development and "undesirable" neighbors. For example, since low income families cannot afford single family homes they are locked out of communities that lack adequate supplies of multi-family units. Long Island's home ownership rate, 80%, is the highest in the country (Gale Research, 1994:251).

Local town and village governments are responsible for these land use decisions. New York's home rule tradition has allowed politicians to carve up Long Island into 1,037 different taxing authorities, including 2 counties, 13 towns, 2 cities, 93 villages, 127 school districts, and 801 special districts. This political fragmentation, coupled with one of the nation's most egregious patronage systems, gives the region one of the highest local tax rates in the country (Schemo, 1994). These high taxes inhibit economic growth but have the status-enhancing benefit of raising the barriers to entry for poorer city residents.

The 1989 recession dealt a severe blow to the Island's economic health. Employment and profit declines on Wall Street, combined with severe regional defense employment cutbacks, lead to a loss of over 100,000 jobs. Long Island, which had been one of the ten most defense dependent regions in the country up until the late 1980s, saw its aerospace industry evaporate (Oden, 1994). Following its 1992 takeover of Grumman Corporation, Northrup terminated thousands of jobs; Long Island had lost its last remaining major aerospace firm (Kmonicek, 1995). Regionally, half of the 60,000 manufacturing jobs lost since 1988 were defense related (Bernstein, 1995). The effects of these cutbacks were severe. Home foreclosure rates shot up 500% between 1988 (962) to 1993 (6,375). Housing prices in many regions saw significant declines, for the first time in decades. Welfare cases increased 45% from 1989-1992 (Schemo, 1994); unemployment rates doubled from 3% to 6% (Bernstein, 1995).

The major regional response to this turmoil came from the Long Island Association (LIA), the Island's largest business association. The LIA sponsored an Economic Summit in 1991, which aimed to strengthen regional planning and ease the permitting maze put in the path of developers. In 1994, the LIA held a second, more ambitious Economic Summit. The Summit process facilitated over a dozen subcommittees covering a wide spectrum of issues, and the LIA reached out to communities throughout the Island through a series of town meetings.

In 1995 the LIA launched Project Long Island, a campaign to generate 28,000 jobs in five years in five targeted industries. The LIA wanted to replace the Island's lost aerospace industrial base with a post-fordist economic base, emphasizing high-tech companies. The five targeted industries all had a strong presence on Long Island, but their industrial growth had never been facilitated by public and quasi-public development programs. The five industry groups are biotechnology and engineering; medical imaging, health care and information systems; computer software; graphics communication; and electronics (Gordon, 1995). The plan was modeled after a California high-tech initiative and relied upon many of the same California consultants. The ultimate goal is to make Long Island a national high-tech leader (Oden, 1994). To achieve this, the LIA argues that the region must overcome many obstacles. The Island must reduce its high tax and utility rates. Fiscal incentives are needed to lure businesses to the Island. Social service costs must be cut by privatizing services and/or cutting service levels. For example, there are plans to consolidate school districts and privatize governmental services, like hospitals. These policies parallel national conservative policies and the neo-liberal globalization paradigm, outlined above.


Back to The Post-Fordist Politics of Sustainability on Long Island		LONG ISLAND: FROM CRISIS TO POST-FORDISM During the post-World War II era, Long Island matured into one of the nation's premier suburban regions. William Levitt pioneered his mass produced housing on Long Island in Island Trees, renamed Levittown in 1948 (Jackson, 1985). This innovation, coupled with federally subsidized home mortgages, allowed housing developments to mushroom across Nassau County, replacing established potato fields. As city residents relocated to the suburbs, Nassau County's population tripled from 400,000 (1940) to 1.4 million (1970). The local employment base was dominated by local service industries for New York City commuters and their families and Long Island's aerospace industries. Long Island secured its suburban preeminence through a combination of size and wealth. With 2.6 million inhabitants in 1990, it is the largest suburban SMSA in the country. In terms of wealth, Long Island ranked first in the nation in median disposable income ($62,000), household retail sales ($33,000), and the percentage of households with incomes over $50,000 (62.7%) in 1995 (Townsend, 1996). In a recent survey, four of the top ten wealthiest towns in the United States were on Long Island; many other Long Island communities were in the list's top fifty (Rather, 1996). Property wealth is carefully guarded through Long Island's maze of exclusionary zoning regulations. The politics of post-war suburban exclusion has centered on issues of race and class (Danielson, 1976; Plotkin, 1987). Large-lot zoning, limitations on multi-family dwellings, and building height restrictions are just a few of the building code regulations used by local communities to limit unwanted development and "undesirable" neighbors. For example, since low income families cannot afford single family homes they are locked out of communities that lack adequate supplies of multi-family units. Long Island's home ownership rate, 80%, is the highest in the country (Gale Research, 1994:251). Local town and village governments are responsible for these land use decisions. New York's home rule tradition has allowed politicians to carve up Long Island into 1,037 different taxing authorities, including 2 counties, 13 towns, 2 cities, 93 villages, 127 school districts, and 801 special districts. This political fragmentation, coupled with one of the nation's most egregious patronage systems, gives the region one of the highest local tax rates in the country (Schemo, 1994). These high taxes inhibit economic growth but have the status-enhancing benefit of raising the barriers to entry for poorer city residents. The 1989 recession dealt a severe blow to the Island's economic health. Employment and profit declines on Wall Street, combined with severe regional defense employment cutbacks, lead to a loss of over 100,000 jobs. Long Island, which had been one of the ten most defense dependent regions in the country up until the late 1980s, saw its aerospace industry evaporate (Oden, 1994). Following its 1992 takeover of Grumman Corporation, Northrup terminated thousands of jobs; Long Island had lost its last remaining major aerospace firm (Kmonicek, 1995). Regionally, half of the 60,000 manufacturing jobs lost since 1988 were defense related (Bernstein, 1995). The effects of these cutbacks were severe. Home foreclosure rates shot up 500% between 1988 (962) to 1993 (6,375). Housing prices in many regions saw significant declines, for the first time in decades. Welfare cases increased 45% from 1989-1992 (Schemo, 1994); unemployment rates doubled from 3% to 6% (Bernstein, 1995). The major regional response to this turmoil came from the Long Island Association (LIA), the Island's largest business association. The LIA sponsored an Economic Summit in 1991, which aimed to strengthen regional planning and ease the permitting maze put in the path of developers. In 1994, the LIA held a second, more ambitious Economic Summit. The Summit process facilitated over a dozen subcommittees covering a wide spectrum of issues, and the LIA reached out to communities throughout the Island through a series of town meetings. In 1995 the LIA launched Project Long Island, a campaign to generate 28,000 jobs in five years in five targeted industries. The LIA wanted to replace the Island's lost aerospace industrial base with a post-fordist economic base, emphasizing high-tech companies. The five targeted industries all had a strong presence on Long Island, but their industrial growth had never been facilitated by public and quasi-public development programs. The five industry groups are biotechnology and engineering; medical imaging, health care and information systems; computer software; graphics communication; and electronics (Gordon, 1995). The plan was modeled after a California high-tech initiative and relied upon many of the same California consultants. The ultimate goal is to make Long Island a national high-tech leader (Oden, 1994). To achieve this, the LIA argues that the region must overcome many obstacles. The Island must reduce its high tax and utility rates. Fiscal incentives are needed to lure businesses to the Island. Social service costs must be cut by privatizing services and/or cutting service levels. For example, there are plans to consolidate school districts and privatize governmental services, like hospitals. These policies parallel national conservative policies and the neo-liberal globalization paradigm, outlined above.